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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 GENEVA 002750

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2015
TAGS: [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [US](#) [RS](#) [UP](#) [BO](#) [KZ](#) [START](#) [JCIC](#) [INF](#)
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) RUSSIAN-HOSTED RECEPTION,
NOVEMBER 8, AND NEXT SESSION DISCUSSION AT CLOSING PLENARY
MEETING, NOVEMBER 9, 2005

REF: GENEVA 2749 (JCIC-XXVII-046)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-033.
2. (U) Meeting Date: November 8, 2005
Event: Russian-Hosted Reception
Time: 6:30 P.M. - 8:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

AND

Meeting Date: November 9, 2005
Event: Closing Plenary Meeting
Time: 9:30 - 10:30 A.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

3. (S) During a Russian-hosted reception on November 8, 2005, U.S. JCIC Delegation members engaged the other Parties' Delegation members on various topics under discussion in the JCIC. Topics included: potential dates for the next inspections at U.S. Navy sites; Tridents in containers; the possibility of a Minuteman III demo; SS-25 first stage rocket motors at the Bershet' C or E facility; SS-25 launch-associated support vehicles; RSM-56 attribution; Ukrainian CTR issues; Belarusian comments on U.S. voting at UN First Committee meeting; and thoughts on timing for the next JCIC session. Specific conversations are reported below.

4. (S) At the conclusion of the closing plenary meeting on November 9, 2005, the delegations also briefly discussed timing for the next session of the JCIC, also reported below. The Ukrainians suggested the session should be no shorter than two weeks and held in May. Belarus indicated that May was problematic. The U.S. said timing and duration should be discussed in diplomatic channels. Russia indicated that timing and duration should be based on substance and prospects for resolution of issues.

NEXT NAVY FACILITY VISITS?

5. (S) Feliciano asked Fedorchenko when the Navy should expect a visit now that the Trident II RVOSI issue has been resolved. Fedorchenko stated that he personally plans to visit Silverdale in one week. (Begin comment: This implies the week of November 14, 2005, or possibly November 21, 2005. End comment.) Fedorchenko also stated his deputy, Captain Kuzmin, or an associate would visit Kings Bay shortly thereafter suggesting "then we can all start the new year with a clear mind."

TRIDENT IN CONTAINERS

6. (S) Feliciano asked Fedorchenko what, in his mind, would make him happy with respect to the Trident II Loading Tubes. Feliciano also asked whether Fedorchenko really wanted to be able to request the removal of a Trident I and Trident II from the containers within the same Treaty year. Fedorchenko stated "as I've told you before, if the U.S. would just make a statement in the agreement to the effect that Trident I is in the process of being decommissioned and the U.S. would like to focus on Trident II, then we would be fine with it." Fedorchenko emphasized, "we know darn well that the U.S. will no longer deploy Trident I and we know it will take some time

to eliminate all of them. So the U.S. should make a similar statement as it did with the Trident II RVOSI issue. That is to say, the U.S. wanted to focus on the Trident II RVOSI because the Trident I was no longer being deployed."

MINUTEMAN III DEMO?

17. (S) Fedorchenko mentioned to Deihl and Feliciano that Russia was still not happy with Minuteman III RVOSI procedures, in that Russian inspectors remained concerned that they cannot confirm that there are no RVs under the "skirt" area of the missile during viewing. He stated that a demonstration should be conducted similar to Trident to ease Russian concerns. He further stated that the verification could be done more effectively if the front section was positioned horizontally so inspectors could see all the way around it. Fedorchenko did not state that Russia would make this an issue in the future.

SS-25 FIRST STAGE
ROCKET MOTORS AT BERSHET'
C OR E FACILITY

18. (S) Kuehne and Buttrick thanked Fedorchenko for the clarifications provided by the Russian Delegation on the issues resulting from the August 2005 data update inspection at the Bershet' Conversion or Elimination (C or E) Facility. Fedorchenko stated that Russia was still working on how to resolve the issue related to permitting U.S. inspectors to view and measure the containers for SS-25 first-stage rocket motors that were stored within the boundaries of the Bershet' C or E Facility while awaiting propellant removal. Kuehne and Buttrick suggested, that if Russia could remove the SS-25 first-stage containers from within the boundary of the site diagram, the problem would be solved. Kuehne said that, since the SS-25 first stages were attributed to the Votkinsk C or E Facility, the Treaty permits these SS-25 first-stage motors to be outside the boundaries of a declared facility because the stages would be at an allowed location, other than the C or E Facility, awaiting propellant removal. Fedorchenko said that he understood, but since there are a limited number of secure and safe buildings to store rocket motors at Bershet', they must also store the SS-25 ICBM containers in the same buildings with SS-24 ICBMs that are attributed to Bershet'. Fedorchenko said that if the United States could provide funds for a new building, Kuehne and Buttrick's suggestion would work, but Russia has limited funds. Therefore, Russia must find alternative solutions to address this problem during future data update inspections at Bershet'.

SS-25 LAUNCH ASSOCIATED
SUPPORT VEHICLES

19. (S) Buttrick stated to Fedorchenko that he personally hoped that Russia would reconsider withdrawing its proposal for placing a distinguishing mark on declared SS-25 launch-associated support vehicles (LASVs). Buttrick said that the U.S. and Russian Delegations had worked hard on the issue for several years and that it was his view that this issue was worth pursuing further. Buttrick said that there were some positive outcomes as a result of Russia's proposal; Russia now declares LASVs during pre-inspection briefings. Fedorchenko agreed, but stated that U.S. inspector comments during recent data update inspections had given reason for Russia's leadership to reconsider the utility of continuing to place marks on LASVs, if U.S. inspectors continued to make the same comments in inspection reports that all SS-25 LASVs were not being declared at the bases. Fedorchenko stated emphatically that Russia was declaring all of the SS-25 LASVs during inspections. He said that Russia could not understand why the U.S. did not believe that all SS-25 LASVs were being declared since they had placed the distinguishing mark on all of those vehicles that provide direct support for ICBM launches. Buttrick said he had discussed this issue with other members of the U.S. Delegation and that the Delegation plans to review this issue in Washington as soon as it returns. In the meantime, Buttrick said that he hoped the Parties could continue to work the issue, and that it was premature to "start over" on this issue. Fedorchenko said that he had also discussed this issue with the Russian Delegation. As a result of the discussion, they had sent a letter back to Moscow informing the Russian leadership that the United States was willing to continue to work the proposal. Fedorchenko stated that he was confident that Russia would continue to place the distinguishing marks on the LASVs, but it was incumbent upon the United States to address the issue by informing its inspectors not to make the same write-up in the inspection reports. Buttrick asked Fedorchenko, if the U.S. were to accept the approach to the LASVs, would Russia replace the paper distinguishing marks on

the LASVs with a mark that would be more permanent. Fedorchenko said that it was Russia's intention to make the marks more permanent, but the next steps and the decision for Russia to move forward would be based on a positive U.S. response to the approach.

RYZHKOV COMMENTS ON TRIDENT
ISSUES, RSM-56 ATTRIBUTION AND
RUSSIA'S SS-25 DEMO PROPOSAL

10. (S) Taylor welcomed Ryzhkov to the work of the JCIC, saying it seemed that when he arrived solutions to problems were not far behind. Ryzhkov demurred, saying that the ground work had been laid and he happened on the scene by chance. He said it had been a protracted struggle in the Russian interagency coming to closure on the Trident RVOSI and Trident in Containers issues and reason had won out on the RVOSI issue. As for the container issue, it was his hope that it could be resolved at the next session. When questioned about the attribution and throw-weight data for the RSM-56 SLBM, Ryzhkov said that the necessary information was available but it too was caught up in an interagency struggle. However, he felt certain that the necessary data would be provided by Christmas. Taylor said that the RVOSI proposal by Russia was well-received by the U.S. Delegation and he hoped that a formal response on Russia's proposal would be forthcoming soon. Ryzhkov said that the proposal was a radical one and one that many in the Russian interagency had objected too. It was based on the work done by the United States for the Trident RVOSI and, remembering Dr. Look's comment that sometimes the Parties must look at problems from many viewpoints and in relation to other issues, Russia had adopted this concept. Ryzhkov said he was glad the two Parties were beginning to work more cooperatively and perhaps the U.S. could focus on ways to resolve Russia's concerns for MM III RVOSIs next.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
ON RUSSIA'S SS-25
DEMONSTRATION PROPOSAL

11. (S) Venevtsov asked Taylor whether there was anything in the SS-25 RVOSI proposal that the U.S. had questions about. Taylor said that the U.S. Delegation was pleased with the initiative Russia had shown in the proposal and would work to get a U.S. response as quickly as possible once he returned to Washington. Questions that the Delegation had raised involved how the measurements taken during the demonstration would be applied to later RVOSIs. Additionally, measurements of the rings, their placement during the demonstration, and measurements of the positions of the rings were all important. Taylor asked Boryak whether he had witnessed the demonstration. Boryak said that he had not, since the demo was a virtual demonstration at this point. Details of the procedures were still being worked out. Taylor asked how long it would take before the demo was ready to be conducted. Boryak said that, after the U.S. indicated it would accept the offer to attend the demo, it would be approximately 30 days.

UKRAINIAN ISSUES REVISITED

12. (S) Shevtsov said that he appreciated the opportunity to hold bilateral discussions and hoped that Buttrick would relay the information from the meeting held that afternoon (REFTEL). Taylor acknowledged that indeed Buttrick had informed him of the meeting. Taylor emphasized that he appreciated Ukraine's concerns, however, the JCIC was not the appropriate forum for discussion of the CTR issues that Shevtsov had raised. However, the U.S. Delegation would see that the information was provided to the Department of Defense and the CTR office. Shevtsov said he felt that the Commission should return to the old way of doing business, with having two sessions a year rather than two parts to a session. They should be longer so that the Parties could have an effective dialogue on the issues. With the short sessions, Ukraine could only present its proposal on Pavlograd and the United States did not have an opportunity to respond. Taylor reminded Shevtsov that, when the Parties use the intersessional period to the maximum, Parties were prepared to respond. As for the issue that Ukraine had placed on the agenda, there had been no such communication as to the proposal nor to the details of the issue. Thus, the U.S. could not be expected to respond this session.

MASTERKOV ASKS
ABOUT JCIC-XXVIII

13. (S) Masterkov asked Taylor when he thought the next session should be held. Taylor said that Washington had not considered any dates at this point. The work of the just-concluded session would first be analyzed and then discussions during the intersession would dictate the timing, agenda and duration of the next session.

BELARUS DISSATISFACTION
WITH U.S.VOTING AT UN
FIRST COMMITTEE MEETING

14. (S) Baichorov stated to Mitchner and Deihl that he had just returned from New York where he attended the UN First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) meetings. He mentioned that Conference on Disarmament (CD) Ambassador Sanders was the U.S. representative. He expressed frustration with the United States, noting that, with the exception of the United States, all countries, including the United States' "very best allies England and France," approved a Belarus proposal to ban all new types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery systems. Deihl asked why he felt the United States did not support the agreement. He replied that Sanders had stated that the United States had no information on any development of new systems or types of WMD at this time and that this type of agreement was unnecessary.

CLOSING PLENARY DISCUSSION
OF DATES FOR NEXT SESSION

15. (S) At the conclusion of the closing plenary meeting on November 9, 2005, the delegations briefly discussed plans for the next session of the JCIC. Shevtsov proposed that the Parties return to two sessions per year, two weeks each in May and October. Baichorov responded that next May does not appear to be a good month for the JCIC, as there are already other negotiations planned for that time that will require the presence of some of the Parties' delegation members, including heads of delegation. Baychorov suggested April may be better. Taylor stated that the timing, duration and agenda of future sessions is an issue more appropriate for the intersessional dialogue. Boryak then concluded that questions of timing and duration should be based on the substance of the issues to be addressed and the prospects for resolution of outstanding issues. He agreed that the Parties should consider these questions during the intersession and communicate through diplomatic channels.

16. (U) Taylor sends.
Cassel